The formula for better Arctic shipping: International governance, regional collaboration — and more ambition all round
Climate-driven sea ice loss has been making the Arctic increasingly accessible and attractive to international shipping companies and cruise operators. But along with these economic opportunities come significant environmental, social and safety risks.
Sam Davin, WWF-Canada’s Senior Specialist, Marine Conservation & Shipping, explains why managing these risks will require International Maritime Organization (IMO) regulation bolstered by regional and national efforts.
Earlier this year, Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment, an Arctic Council working group, reported that from 2013 to 2023, the number of ships operating in the Arctic grew 37 per cent while the total distance sailed increased by 111 per cent. This had the effect of doubling underwater noise pollution and nearly quadrupling greenhouse gas emissions.
In the Canadian Arctic alone, polluting discharges from ships in marine protected areas increased by 33 per cent in just a three-year segment of that period (2019 to 2022).
This increase in Arctic shipping is arriving as the planet confronts dual climate and biodiversity crises. According to WWF’s 2024 Living Planet Report, marine species populations have declined by 56 per cent in the past 50 years. This underscores the urgent need to improve the sustainability of shipping, especially in sensitive regions like the Arctic.
As the UN agency that regulates international shipping, the IMO’s strength lies in bringing together diverse stakeholders — like Member States, intergovernmental organizations, and environmental and industry non-governmental organizations — to negotiate and adopt guidelines and international regulations. Through statutes like MARPOL (the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships) and SOLAS (the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea,) the IMO sets minimum standards to manage environmental and safety risks.
The IMO can do better
The agency also has the authority to designate regional protective measures where global standards fall short. This enables targeted responses to specific challenges, such as Emission Control Areas in the Canadian Arctic and Norwegian Sea. In fact, the IMO adopted such measures earlier this year to reduce emissions of sulphur oxide, nitrogen oxide and particulate matter in these regions.
These measures follow the adoption of the Polar Code in 2017 — which established mandatory safety and environmental standards tailored to polar waters, covering ship design, crew training and pollution prevention—and the Arctic heavy fuel oil (HFO) ban in 2021, which came into effect on July 1, 2024. Both were geared towards minimizing risks to the Arctic.
The IMO is now poised to play a key role in implementing the High Seas Treaty, also known as the UN Agreement on Marine Biodiversity in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction. This could see the organization use its authority to create enforceable protections in the high seas by designating regions known as Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas, including in critical regions like the Central Arctic Ocean.
But the IMO’s decision-making processes imperfectly balance environmental protections with economic considerations, often resulting in regulations that fall short of environmental best practices. Similarly, its consensus-driven structure can dilute ambitious proposals and delay crucial action.
Consider the HFO ban: it recognized the environmental risks, but deployed a phased approach that allows some ships to continue using HFO in the Arctic until as late as 2029. Similarly, measures to regulate underwater noise remain voluntary, despite the known harms caused to marine mammals. In addition, the IMO has yet to implement mandatory measures to control black carbon emissions, critical to preserving snow and sea ice habitat.
Regulatory gaps persist
Further barriers to adequate protection exist because the IMO does not yet regulate certain harmful substances and technologies, like greywater and scrubbers. The absence of global regulations on issues like these prevents the Polar Code from offering enhanced protections tailored to the Arctic environment.
The same holds true for IMO-designated Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas and Special Areas. In addition, the Polar Code excludes significant parts of the Arctic, including waters under Nordic and Russian jurisdiction, and it does not apply to all ships. (It excludes all small vessels, although guidelines have been introduced for fishing vessels longer than 24 metres and private pleasure yachts. There are no requirements applied for cargo ships under 500 gross tonnes.)
The IMO will continue to play a central role in shaping the future of Arctic shipping, but it must address its regulatory gaps to safeguard the region’s vulnerable ecosystems. In the meantime, Arctic states can use their jurisdictional authorities to introduce stronger local regulations.
A good example is Canada’s prohibition on any discharge of oil in its Arctic waters, exceeding the Polar Code’s limit of five parts per million. States can also incorporate Indigenous knowledge, values and priorities to improve both national measures and international governance.
The Arctic Council — an intergovernmental forum that includes the eight Arctic states as well as Indigenous Peoples organizations, like the Inuit Circumpolar Council, Gwich’in Council International and Saami Council — can then complement national and IMO efforts.
It can facilitate knowledge-sharing and dialogue between Arctic rightsholders and stakeholders, promote best practices and new research, and foster collaboration with the non-Arctic states whose vessels are increasingly present in Arctic waters.
This article originally appeared in The Circle: Navigating a Changing Arctic